This compilation gathers the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues handed down by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ADAMČO v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2) ■ Applications nos. 55792/20 and 2 others
Absence of convincing security needs for systematically subjecting a prisoner to thorough strip searches for an extensive period of time and despite a complex set of other security arrangements: violation of Article 3.
Inspection by prison officers of the applicant’s documents on the occasion of consultations with his lawyers in prison, without reasons suggesting an abuse in the privileged channel of communication with his lawyers: violation of Article 8.
Remaining complaints not examined (partly dissenting opinion of Judge Serghides).
RIBÁR v. SLOVAKIA ■ Application no. 56545/21
Failure to exhaust domestic remedies: complaint partly inadmissible.
Prisoner confined in his cell for 23 hours a day and limited out-of-cell activity for more than one year and four months; adequate personal space; cumulative detention conditions not amounting to ill-treatment: no violation of Article 3.
NECDET VURAL v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 35555/19
Prisoner denied authorisation to receive publications in prison, either paid for by himself or sent by his relatives: violation of Article 10.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ADAMČO v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2) ■ Applications nos. 55792/20 and 2 others ■ First Section ■ 12 December 2024
Art 3 ■ Absence of convincing security needs for systematically subjecting a prisoner to thorough strip searches for an extensive period of time and despite a complex set of other security arrangements ■ No attention paid to the applicant’s behaviour throughout the service of his prison sentence ■ Relevant legal provisions prescribing searches applied without any discretion to consider the particular circumstances ■ Likely aggravation of any possible feeling of the applicant of being the victim of arbitrary measures by the rejection of any remedy he used without individual consideration of his substantive arguments ■ Facts did not reach the level of severity to be qualified as “inhuman”
Art 8 ■ Inspection of the applicant’s documents, including to some extent their content, on the occasion of consultations with his lawyers in prison ■ No reasonable cause shown to exist suggesting the documents contained an unlawful element or any other abuse in the privileged channel of communication with his lawyers ■ Absence of appropriate safeguards
Facts ■ The applicant had been serving a prison sentence since 2006, for violent offences related to organised crime. As a result of his sentence, he was repeatedly subjected to specific restrictions, including “thorough strip search” (dôkladná osobná prehliadka – TSS), during which he was stripped naked, had to perform a squat, and was visually searched. TSS were carried out when the applicant received visits (including from his lawyer), took part in investigative measures outside prisons, and in connection with transfers to court hearings and between prisons. He complained under Article 3 that he had been routinely subjected to TSS over a period of 12 years (the exact number of TSS could not be established but it was arguably above a thousand, see § 96), which had amounted to treatment contrary to Article 3.
The applicant also complained under Article 3 that during a break in a court hearing he was not able to use the toilet because his request to have one of his hands released from a special restraining device (consisting of handcuffs and leg-cuffs, which are connected by a chain that is attached to a belt) was rejected.
In addition, the applicant complained under Article 8 that he was subjected to a TSS and that his documents were inspected on 14 individual instances prior to and following consultations with his lawyers.
Law ■ Preliminary objections
The Court dismissed the Government’s objection for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because he had failed to bring an action for the protection of personal integrity: the Court recalled it had rejected the effectiveness of this action in a previous case (Maslák v. Slovakia (no. 2) (no. 38321/17, §§ 118-26, 31 March 2022). Furthermore, the Court observed that the applicant filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court, which did not criticise the applicant for not having exhausted the remedy mentioned by the Government.
The Court also dismissed the Government’s objection that the applicant had raised specific facts (that he had been subjected to a TSS four times within a short space of time on a day when he had seen two of his lawyers separately) before the Constitutional Court only (and not in complaints before the prison administration or the Public Prosecution Service). The Court noted in this respect that “the applicant’s constitutional complaint was rejected as a whole without any reference to the admissibility rule of exhaustion of ordinary remedies” (§ 55).
Finally, as to whether the applicant (who had complained about four specific instances of TSS – out of over a thousand) should have denounced every instance of TSS, the Court considered that this would have been “excessively formalistic” (§ 62). Having examined the rules governing the use of TSS, as well as the 2018 CPT report on Slovakia (CPT/INF (2019) 20) which showed that “the strip-searching of prisoners was still a frequent occurrence in all the prisons visited” (§ 60), the Court considered that “carrying out a TSS on the applicant […] constituted a “continuing situation” in terms of its case-law” (§ 62).
Law ■ Article 3
(a) Admissibility
The Court found the part of the complaint on TSS admissible. However, it found that the part of the complaint concerning the refusal to release one of the applicant’s hands from the SRD during a break in a court hearing in order that he could use the toilet was manifestly ill-founded.
The Court noted that the applicant had been prevented from using the toilet on a single occasion, that no use of force was involved and that the applicant did not suffer from any health problem on the day of the incident. The Court further noted that there was “no indication that the contested measure aimed to debase or humiliate the applicant or that it produced any severe physical or mental effects on him” (§ 69) and that it cannot be contested that it served a security-related purpose.
(b) Merits
General principles: Roth v. Germany, nos. 6780/18 and 30776/18, §§ 64-69, 22 October 2020; Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, § 117, 24 July 2001; Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, no. 50901/99, §§ 61-62, 4 February 2003; Frérot v. France, no. 70204/01, § 47, 12 June 2007; Wainwright v. the United Kingdom, no. 12350/04, §§ 40 and 42, 26 September 2006
The Court observed that beyond the specific occurrences of TSS, “what is essentially at stake is the practice of systematically submitting him to such searches in certain legally defined types of a situation” (§ 82).
The Court first noted that although the legislation governing TSS does not specify whether the searched inmate would have to perform a squat, the parties’ submissions led the Court to take this practice as established (§ 85) – and to stress that the lack of precision of the rules (and the lack of records of TSS), “provides room for irregularities and arbitrariness” (§ 96).
The measure being very invasive, it therefore requires specific justification. Yet, the argument put forward by the authorities (that the measure had a legal basis, that the applicant had been convicted for violent offences and had trangressed prison discipline on specific occasions) they did not convince the Court, who observed “no attention at all [had been paid] to the applicant’s behaviour throughout the service of his prison sentence” (§ 92) and notably the fact that no illicit item had been found on him during the searches.
The Court further underlined that although both the applicant’s “stay in prison and his movements outside of it [were] subject to a number of complex and strict security arrangements aimed at limiting the risk of his coming into possession of anything prohibited […] this aspect of the case has had no impact on the practice of the TSS in respect of the applicant”
This led the Court to conclude that “for an extensive period of time, and despite a complex set of other security arrangements, the applicant has been systematically subjected to TSSs in the absence of convincing security needs” (§ 99). According to the Court, the applicant might have felt “ that he [had] been the victim of arbitrary measures […] and […] this feeling might be aggravated by the fact that any remedy he has made use of has been rejected without his substantive arguments having in fact been given any individual consideration” (§ 100).
The Court concluded that the combination of these effects “resulted in a degree of humiliation exceeding the – unavoidable and hence tolerable – level that strip-searches of prisoners inevitably involve” (§ 101). The Court however that the facts did not reach a level of severity required to constitute “inhuman” treatment (§ 102).
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3.
Law ■ Article 8
The Court noted that the fact that the applicant’s documents were inspected before and after his meetings with his lawyers, that the interference was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim. However, the Court did not find the measure to be necessary.
The Court recalled that “exchanges between a lawyer and his detained client enjoy privileged status under Article 8”, which means that prison authorities may only control the correspondence between a prisoner and their lawyer “when the authorities have reasonable cause to believe that the privilege is being abused in that the contents of the letter endanger prison security or the safety of others or are otherwise of a criminal nature” (§ 119).
The Court further noted that while the applicant’s lawyers were subject to deontological rules “there [had] not been any suggestion or other indication of any transgression against those rules” (§ 121). Furthermore, the applicant’s meeting with his lawyers took place in a room equipped with a CCTV camera and with the applicant being separated from his lawyers by bars. Lastly, the Court repeated that no prohibited items had been found on the applicant during his many years in prison.
The Court also noted that the examination of the documents was carried out by three officers, which did not guarantee that the inspection did not entail an examination of the contents of the documents; and that the applicant’s complaints had been rejected by domestic bodies without individual examination. The Court concluded that the inspection of the applicant’s documents had not been accompanied by appropriate safeguards.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8.
Law ■ Remaining complaints
The Court noted that, in connection with the part of the complaint concerning the refusal to release one of the applicant’s hand from the SRD in order for him to use the toilet, the applicant also complained that his rights under Article 8 had been violated, and that he did not have an effective remedy in this respect.
Referring to the case Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC] (no. 47848/08, § 156, 17 July 2014), the Court considered that it had “dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints” (§ 131).
Article 41 ■ EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 3,500 in respect of costs and expenses.
Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Serghides ■ Judge Serghides disagreed with the Court’s argument concerning the applicant’s “remaining complaints”, namely that these complaints would not be examined because the Court had dealt with “the main legal questions raised by the case” (§ 131 of the judgment), and that the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction is to be accordingly dismissed.
Judge Serghides argued that the principle of effectiveness, the principle of indivisibility of rights, and the right of individual application create a duty for the Court to examine the complaints raised by the applicant. He strongly opposed the distinction made by the Court between “main” and “secondary” complaints, and the subsequent decision not to examine the latter – which “may amount to a denial of justice” and “may run counter to the jurisdiction, task and role of the Court […]; […] may show disregard for, and an absolute lack of protection of, the Convention rights which are not examined; […] may be considered arbitrary and against the rule of law; and […] may undermine the legitimacy of the Court and the trust of the public that should be placed in it” (§ 5 of the partly dissenting opinion).
Judge Serghides contested that “human dignity levels out all human rights without the need to examine them separately” (§ 6). Since the scope of the notion of “dignity” varies from Article to Article, the Court is required to examine breaches to human dignity separately (in this case, under Articles 3 and 8).
Judge Serghides also contested the use by the Court of the Grand Chamber Judgment Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania. In his view, the Grand Chamber did not intend “to establish a recommended practice for the Court in future cases, that is to say, to arbitrarily pick and choose complaints on which to decide while not considering the rest” (§ 6).
Judge Serghidess accordingly concluded that in his view, the “established practice of the Court, which consists in picking and choosing the complaints which it considers as ‘main’ and leaving the other complaints without any consideration at all […] is […] erroneous […and] should be abandoned” (§ 7).
RIBÁR v. SLOVAKIA ■ Application no. 56545/21 ■ First Section ■ 12 December 2024
Art 35 § 1 ■ Applicant’s failure to exhaust available domestic remedies with regard to part of his complaint
Art 3 ■ Applicant’s detention on remand to prevent him from interfering with the course of justice for more than one year and four months, with 23-hour confinement to his cell and very limited out-of-cell activity ■ Adequate personal space ■ Cumulative conditions of detention not amounting to ill-treatment under Art 3
Facts ■ The applicant, a practising lawyer, was charged with organised crime related offences. Following his arrest in October 2019, he was placed in pre-trial detention to prevent him from interfering with the course of justice and from continuing to engage in criminal activities. The applicant contested the grounds of his detention.
The applicant was confined to his cell up to 23 hours a day (23 hours and 30 minutes during the COVID-19 pandemic), and he was only entitled to receive visits and make telephone calls with the authorisation of the relevant prosecuting authority. The applicant received only closed in-person visits by his spouse in September and October 2020; his requests to receive other visits were dismissed. After several refusals, he was granted permission to telephone his family members without the presence of a third person in December 2020 and March 2021.
In addition, post sent to and by him had to pass inspection by that authority. Consequently, his private correspondence took on average seventeen to nineteen days, following dispatch, to reach its recipient). He was held alone in a double-occupancy cell of a surface area of 8.02 sq. m., part of which was taken up by furniture.
In July 2021, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, in which he complained of his detention conditions and his detention regime (lack of natural lighting in his cell, confinement to his cell for 23 hours a day, lack of activities, lack of visits and telephone calls, etc.). The Constitutional Court rejected this complaint as inadmissible, on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as he could have filed a complaint with the Public Prosecution Service.
The applicant was released in May 2021, after the Constitutional Court found his remand detention lacked grounds.
Law ■ Preliminary objections
The Court accepted the Government’s objections that the applicant had not used domestic remedies in respect of specific aspects of his detention conditions (exposure to daylight in a cell, the availability of hot water in a cell, the temperature of a cell, the quality and quantity of prison food and interference with sleep) that could have been complained of before the Public Prosecution Service. Similarly, he could have complemented his complaint before the Public Prosecution Service about his lack of contact with and visits from family members, by a complaint before the Constitutional Court.
Conversely, the Court found that the parts of the complaint concerning the size of the applicant’s cell, the amount of time for which the applicant was confined to his cell, the amount of time allowed for his outdoor periods and the conditions under which these outdoor periods were spent, the lack of in-cell or other out-of-cell activities, and the size of his cell, were regulated by statutory rules and “could not have been effectively challenged at the domestic level” (§ 85, the Court also refers to the 2018 CPT report CPT/INF (2019) 20).
Law ■ Article 3
General principles: Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, § 103, 20 October 2016
The Court examined solely the part of the complaints concerning the size of the applicant’s cell, the amount of time for which he had been confined to it, the amount of time allowed for his outdoor periods, the conditions in which such outdoor periods had been spent and the lack of any possibility for him to engage in any in-cell or other out-of-cell activities.
The Court noted that the only out-of-cell activity allowed to the applicant was a daily outdoor period of one hour, and a weekly opportunity to see the prison chaplain. The Court also noted that the facts alleged by the applicants are “consonant with the findings in the CPT’s report on its 2018 visit to Slovakia” (§ 97). The Court underlined that “its role is conceptually different from that assigned to the CPT” (§ 98) and that it must “take account of the cumulative effects of the conditions of his detention” (idem).
First, the Court observed that since the applicant was held in a cell with a surface area of 8.02 sq. M., there was no issue of lack of personal space (§ 99). It stressed that the case needs to be distinguished from other cases where prisoners were held in a similar regime (with limited outdoor exercise), but with less personal space at their disposal (Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, § 131, 22 October 2009; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242/03, §§ 66-69, 21 December 2010; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833/04, §§ 86-88, 27 January 2011; Tunis v. Estonia, no. 429/12, §§ 45-46, 19 December 2013).
Second, the Court underlined that the applicant was held in his cell alone at his own request (§ 102, quoting § 15).
Third the Court observed that other aspects of the applicant’s detention that would enable it to assess its adequacy were not complained about or were found inadmissible (see above, “preliminary objections”).
Fourth, the Court noted that on four specific occasions, when interviewed by the investigative authorities on his detention regime, the applicant “who himself is a lawyer and also benefited from legal advice” (§ 104) had no complaint to make; and the proceedings before the Court “indicate no fear or other circumstance that might have prevented him from raising such matters at the national level at the given time” (idem).
Fifth, the Court noted that the applicant’s detention under the contested regime (one year and four months), “although significant” (§ 105) was shorter than in other cases in which a violation of Article 3 had been found in similar circumstances (Orchowski, Skachkov v. Russia (no. 25432/05, §§ 50 and 54, 7 October 2010). Similarly, the Court reminded that a violation of Article 3 had been found for shorter periods of detention, but in cases where “the underlying situation had been much more severe” (§ 105, refering to Keyahov v. Bulgaria, no. 41035/98, §§ 69-74, 18 January 2005).
Sixth, the Court declared it was a aware that “the Constitutional Court retrospectively found that [the applicant’s detention] had lacked adequate grounds” (§ 106), but explained that this is “primarily a matter to be considered under Article 5 of the Convention, as it was at the national level, and this is beyond the scope of the present case” (idem).
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 3.
Law ■ Article 14
The applicant also complained that on account of the fact that his detention had been imposed for the purpose of preventing him from interfering with the course of justice, his detention regime had been stricter than those of prisoners detained on remand on other grounds, and those of sentenced prisoners.
The Court recalled that parts of the complaints concerning the applicant’s detention conditions and private and family life were declared inadmissible; and that for the remainder of the application, no violation of Article 3 had been found.
The Court therefore concluded that the matters complained of do not constitute a violation of Article 3.
Conclusion ■ Manifestly ill-founded.
NECDET VURAL v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 35555/19 ■ Second Section Committee ■ 17 December 2024
Art 10 ■ Refusal of applicant’s request to receive publications in prison, either paid for by himself or sent by his relatives.
Facts ■ The applicant had been detained in pre-trial detention. He requested before the enforcement judge authorisation to obtain periodical and non-periodical publications either at his own expense or through deliveries by his immediate relatives. He argued that due to overcrowding he could not access the prison library.
His request was rejected by the enforcement judge, based on a decision made by the Education Board of the prison in which he was held, who had “suspended the delivery of publications to inmates due to concerns over the potential misuse of books, including the risk of starting fires that could threaten the safety of the inmates, their cellmates, and the overall prison population” (§ 4). The Assize Court and the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s application against the decision of the enforcement judge.
Law ■ Article 10
General principles: Osman and Altay v. Türkiye, nos. 23782/20 and 40731/20, § 33, 18 July 2023; Mehmet Çiftci v. Turkey, no. 53208/19, §§ 32-45, 16 November 2021
(a) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s preliminary objections. As regards the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (e.g. that the applicant should have filed a complaint with the prison administration in the first place), the Court noted that the applicant’s applications before the enforcement judge, the assize court and the Constitutional Court were examined on the substance, and none of those courts considered that the applicant had not complied with the requirement to first raise a complaint with the prison administration.
As regards the lack of victim status of the applicant (because he had neither requested any publications from the prison administration, nor had his relatives brought in any books or publications for him, and he continued to have access to the prison library), the Court noted that the Education board of the prison had generally suspended the delivery of publications to inmates, and that the applicant was therefore directly affected by this measure “even in the absence of a concrete measure of implementation refusing the delivery of a specific publication to the applicant” (§ 15).
(b) Merits
The Court noted that the domestic courts have not carried out an adequate balance between “the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and other interests at stake, such as the maintenance of security and discipline in prisons” (§ 24). None of those courts have examined the applicant’s personal situation to assess the potential risk of delivering publications to him in prison..
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 10.
Article 41 ■ The finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage; the Court dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction as the applicant did not submit any receipts or invoices indicating the costs and expenses he had incurred.
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